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I .  INTRODUCTION
A weak proposal for enhanced special autonomy (otonomi khusus plus or otsus plus) for Papua, 
drafted in October 2013 by the Papuan provincial government, has been vastly improved by the 
government of Papua Barat, and now represents a detailed, workable program for improving the 
lives of indigenous Papuans. The question is whether it will be embraced by the Papuan public 
and sent on to Jakarta as a consensus draft or be pushed to the side by political considerations, 
local and national. If the former, it could become one of the most interesting policy initiatives 
on Papua in the last decade.
The original concept of otsus plus, developed in talks between Papuan Governor Lukas Enembe 
and President Yudhoyono in April 2013, was to “reconstruct” the 2001 Special Autonomy Law 
for Papua that was widely acknowledged to have failed. In October, a drafting team appointed by 
Enembe produced a draft law that focused on increasing the authority of the governor, raising 
provincial revenues, and giving the province a greater say in the operations of corporations oper-
ating in Papua. While a stated principle of the draft law was to ensure preferential treatment for 
indigenous Papuans, it offered few ideas for how to do so.
In early November, Enembe invited Papua Barat Governor Bram Atururi to Jayapura to discuss 
the draft, hoping that he would just sign on to it and go home. Instead, Atururi returned to 
Manokwari, the Papua Barat capital, and put together his own drafting team, giving it less than a 
week to come up with an improved version. The team included Dr. Agus Sumule, former adviser 
to Enembe’s predecessor and now a professor at Papua State University. The result may have 
been hastily produced, but in terms of its provisions on agriculture, health, education, credit 
and cooperatives, mining, population, human rights and much else, it is a major improvement 
on the original. 
One example: the education section in the Jayapura draft consists of one article with several 
generic provisions on the right of Papuans to receive quality education. The Papua Barat draft 
sets a goal of ending illiteracy within five years of the law’s coming into force, makes education 
free and mandatory through junior high school, and pays particular attention to how to over-
come the perennial shortage of qualified teachers in remote areas. 
The Papua Barat draft, which was only completed on 13 November, will now go back to Enembe 
to see if the two drafts can be reconciled. There is almost no chance of its being debated by the 
national parliament, let alone passed, before President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono leaves 
office in 2014. Earlier this month, Enembe was saying that he still wanted to make a push to 
get the proposed bill to Jakarta, fast-track it with the president’s support, and get it approved 
in December, but that was before such a radically different version was prepared by Papua 
Barat. It also would have meant no time for any public debate on the contents. Now that the 
differences between the two drafts are so stark, the possibility of a consensus draft getting to 
Jakarta by December is even more remote, and with 2014 an election year, it effectively means 
postponement of parliamentary consideration to 2015.
In the meantime, various groups in both provinces are protesting the idea of otsus plus. One 
reason is that though Enembe enthusiastically adopted the idea, it is still seen in some quarters 
as yet another attempt by Jakarta to find a substitute for failed policies of the past without ap-
propriate consultation with Papuans. The Jayapura draft was tightly held by the governor’s staff 
with little dissemination and no public discussion, at least thus far. Some academics and NGOs 
contrast this with the very open process that produced the 2001 law. 
Others argue that the whole idea of otsus plus ignores the larger issue lurking in the wings, 
the ongoing desire of many Papuans for independence. Before yet another solution purporting 
to fix Papua’s ills is put forward, they say, the fundamental issue of Papua’s political status needs 
to be discussed. 
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The draft from Papua Barat could inject an additional element of politics into the process. 
While it is more coherent, more detailed and more useful as a roadmap for change than the 
original, this in itself could create resentment in Jayapura. Also, Enembe is the chair for Papua 
of President Yudhoyono’s party, Partai Demokrat, while Governor Atururi of Papua Barat rep-
resents the Gerindra party, whose leader, former army special forces commander Prabowo Sub-
ianto, is a candidate for president. With national elections looming, the Papua Barat draft could 
be seen by Enembe and those around him as an effort by Gerindra to upstage the president’s 
man in Jayapura and make Gerindra the standard-bearer for change.
It would be a major loss if some of the ideas in the Manokwari draft fell victim to petty 
politics.
II .  THE ORIGINS OF OTSUS PLUS
By all accounts the idea of otsus plus emerged in discussions between Lukas Enembe and Pres-
ident Yudhoyono shortly after Enembe’s installation as governor in April 2013. Yudhoyono, 
nearing the end of his final term, was reportedly interested in leaving behind a positive legacy 
on Papua that would involve a “re-design” of special autonomy. Enembe wanted to capitalize on 
his Partai Demokrat links with the president and mark his first 100 days in office with a major 
initiative. 
On 29 April, Enembe met the president to discuss the idea, bringing with him Deputy Gov-
ernor Klemen Tinal and two of his own closest political allies, Timotius Murib, head of the 
MRP, and Yunus Wonda, then acting head of the Papuan provincial legislature. Yudhoyono was 
accompanied by his Papua adviser, Velix Wanggai, and several ministers. 
Enembe and his team proposed twenty points that might form the core of otsus plus. 
Among them were expansion of the governor’s authority, involvement of the provincial gov-
ernment in the renegotiation of the Freeport mining company’s contract, the re-establishment 
of international services at Biak’s airport, clemency for political prisoners, ability to represent 
Indonesia in relations with the Pacific, enhanced affirmative action for indigenous Papuans 
in the security forces, increased grants for infrastructure, affirmation of Papua as the host for 
the 2020 Indonesian games, building a large statue of Christ overlooking Jayapura, ensuring 
housing and clean water for indigenous Papuans and establishing sports centres throughout 
Papua.1 Enembe said the president agreed to them all.2 
The two sides agreed that if Enembe and his team could produce a new draft law by August, 
the president would try to fast-track its passage through parliament. He would also announce it 
in the traditional state of the nation address on 16 August, the day before Indonesia’s indepen-
dence anniversary, and personally come to Papua to deliver the “gift” of otsus plus.3  
The twenty points may have had support in Jakarta, but they did not prove as popular back in 
Papua. On 22 May, Yunus Wonda told the press that the president would announce clemency for 
political prisoners in his August address.4 Immediately, 26 pro-independence prisoners in Abe-
pura prison, most detained on rebellion charges, announced that they would reject clemency if 
offered and said what was needed was not prisoners being freed, but the Papuan people being 
1 Speech of Governor Lukas Enembe to the opening of the Special Working Meeting of the Papuan provincial government 
on 29 May 2013, as reprinted in Cenderawasih Pos on 30 May. The meeting was convened to produce a five-year plan for 
Papua.
2 IPAC interview with Lukas Enembe, Jayapura, 6 November 2013.
3 “August 2013, Presiden Beri Hadiah Bagi Papua”, Bintang Papua, 23 May 2013.
4 “SBY Bakal Bebaskan Tapol Napol”, Cenderawasih Pos, 23 May 2013.
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freed from the Indonesian government’s colonial clutches.5 
On 29 May, Enembe announced the broad outlines of expanded autonomy in a speech to the 
provincial government that was reprinted in a local newspaper.6  Various activist groups then 
began announcing their rejection of it.
In June, a working draft of the otsus plus law emerged that was quickly found to be a copy-
and-paste adaptation of the 2006 Law on the Governance of Aceh (LOGA) – so much so that it 
accidentally left in wording in Article 89 that broadcasting would be based on Islamic values – a 
provision that clearly made no sense for heavily Christian Papua.7  
On 25 July – as it became clear that the August deadline was not going to be met – the  MRP 
held a three-day consultation to evaluate special autonomy.8 Some 300 people from across the 
seven cultural areas of Papua attended. The conclusion was not just that autonomy had failed 
to improve the lives of indigenous Papuans but that their situation had actually deteriorated in 
the twelve years it had been in force.9 The meeting then produced a resolution that the 2001 law 
should not be amended before a dialogue had taken place between the people of Papua and the 
central government, mediated by a neutral third party.  
The MRP’s resolution took both Enembe and Jakarta by surprise and ended any prospect of 
a presidential visit in the immediate future. 
The governor then asked the head of the local planning board, Musa’ad, and a group of 
academics from Cenderawasih University, to come up with a new draft. In early October they 
produced a far more substantive version of a “Law on the Governance of Papua” that no one 
could accuse of being a mere replica of the Aceh law.10 The governor, clearly hoping to get it to 
Jakarta as soon as possible, asked two major stakeholders to review it. The first was the MRP, 
which returned a revised draft on 11 November.  Among its proposed changes was that not 
only the governor and deputy governor but all other local executives, including district heads 
(bupati), mayors (walikota) and their deputies as well as subdistrict and village heads, be indig-
enous Papuans.11   
The second review came from Manokwari. On 4 November Enembe had invited a delegation 
from Papua Barat led by Governor Bram Atururi to Jayapura to receive and sign off on the new 
draft.  But Atururi, while giving the idea of otsus plus guarded endorsement, told Enembe that 
he needed time to review the draft carefully. He promised to have it back within a week.  
On arrival in Manokwari, Atururi called a meeting of senior staff and gave them the draft to 
look at. The first thing they noticed was that Enembe’s drafters had not used the word “Papua 
Barat” anywhere in the document and in the preamble, had not even mentioned Law No.35/2008 
that had extended special autonomy status to Papua Barat, despite the fact that the draft pur-
5 “Tapol Papua Merdeka Tolak Rencana Pemberian Grasi”, 3 June 2013, available at knpbnews.com/blog/archives/2008. 
While the 26 claimed to speak on behalf of all political prisoners, one of their lawyers said that many prisoners detained 
elsewhere, and even some of those in Abepura, wanted to be released and would in fact accept clemency if offered.
6 IPAC interview with Lukas Enembe, Jayapura, 6 November 2013.
7 “Pemerinah Bantah Jiplak Naskah Akademik UU Otsus Plus Papua,” Sinar Harapan, 29 August 2013.
8 Members of the Papua Barat MRP had been invited but after Governor Atururi announced at the last minute that there 
would be a separate consultation in Manokwari,  only a few attended.
9 IPAC interview with Rev. Hofni, deputy head of the MRP, Jayapura, 7 November 2013. The seven areas are Mamta/Tabi, 
Saireri, Domberai, Bomberai, Anim Ha/Ha Anim, La Pago, and Mee Pago.
10 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor:00 tentang Pemerintahan Papua”, Tim Assistensi Daerah Ran-
cangan Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Papua, Jayapura, October 2013.
11 This proposal goes far beyond a November 2009 proposal by the MRP to limit all candidates for bupati and deputy bupati 
to those verified as indigenous Papuans. The decision was never implemented after it was rejected by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs for being discriminatory. Similar objections are likely if the current draft law is brought to Jakarta. For more on the 
decision and the politics surrounding it, see International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in Papua”, Asia 
Briefing No. 108, 3 August 2010.
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ported to cover both provinces.12 Atururi then appointed his own drafting team to make revi-
sions, and on 13 November, they turned in the results.13
The next step is for the two drafts to be consolidated. This has made consideration of the bill 
by the Indonesian parliament this year all but impossible. On the other hand, it opens the possi-
bility for public debate and discussion of the substance that thus far has been absent.
III .  THE ‘PLUS’ IN OTSUS PLUS
Both the Jayapura and Manokwari drafts constitute extensive reworkings of Law 21/2001 and 
both in many ways are wish lists. The Jayapura draft focuses largely on increasing the provincial 
government’s revenues, and giving the province (and particularly the governor) greater control 
over natural resource concessions and operations. Enembe acknowledges that he knows he has 
asked for more than Jakarta would ever give, but sees the draft as an opening bargaining posi-
tion.14
The Manokwari drafters have left in most of Enembe’s suggestions for greater provincial 
revenues, believing that the central government will reject most of them. They concentrate 
instead on fleshing out the provisions on protecting indigenous Papuans. Even if some of their 
ideas also go beyond what Home Affairs (or the Constitutional Court) would likely approve, 
they are at least serious attempts to address recognized problems.
Neither draft makes any attempt to roll back the clock or fight lost battles by trying, for example, 
to reunite the two provinces under a single administration. Nevertheless, the Manokwari draft 
provides a detailed basis for a discussion on how to advance a progressive policy agenda on Pap-
ua within the framework of Indonesian sovereignty.
A. Demographics
One of the most fraught issues in Papua today is how to prevent indigenous Papuans from being 
swamped by the unending influx of migrants from other parts of Indonesia. The Jayapura draft 
merely calls for preferential treatment and affirmative action in various fields. The Manokwari 
version has a detailed program for addressing the problem on several fronts (Section 30, Popu-
lation and Employment).
It starts from the principle that in-migration of non-Papuans must be restricted. There 
would be strict controls and monitoring at all points of entry into Papua and within kabupaten 
(the administrative level directly below a province). Anyone trying to enter without a valid 
national identification card, known as KTP, would be turned back. Indigenous Papuans would 
have special ID cards that would entitle them to special facilities; non-Papuans would be given 
temporary residence permits or ID cards identifying them as “seasonal workers”. A thorough 
and accurate census would be conducted – a particular challenge for Papua where population 
statistics are often deliberately inflated.15 Population growth of indigenous Papuans would be 
encouraged, including through particular attention to maternal and child healthcare, and no 
official transmigration programs would be allowed into Papua until the indigenous popula-
tion had reached 20 million (it is now less than 3 million). Investors would need to ensure that 
at least 50 per cent of employees recruited be indigenous Papuans.
12 IPAC interview, Agus Sumule, 18 November 2013.
13 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Tentang Pemerintahan Otonomi Khusus Di Tanah Papua”, unofffical 
draft, Manokwari, November 2013.
14 IPAC interview with Lukas Enembe, 6 November 2013.
15 See IPAC Report No. 3, “Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble”, 9 October 2013.
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A major source of migrants has been the booming agribusiness industry, especially palm oil. 
The Jayapura draft has no specific provisions on plantations. The Manokwari draft (Article 82) 
requires that a Papuan smallholder plantation program be developed with appropriate fund-
ing and inputs. It also requires that any company investing in plantations include a Papuan 
smallholder program (plasma), reserving five ha per indigenous Papuan household in the area. 
Special extension services for Papuan farmers in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, plan-
tations and fishing would be established, with centres at both the provincial and sub-provincial 
levels.
B. Land and Mining
Both drafts have sections on land (Section 22 in the Jayapura draft, Section 21 in the Manokwari 
draft) but whereas the former consists of a set of generic principles, beginning with “Every Indo-
nesian citizen in Papua has the right to land in accordance with existing law”, the Manokwari draft 
starts with the principle that use of any land owned communally or individually by indigenous 
Papuans shall be through rental or contract – i.e., it is not available for sale. A land and building tax 
will be imposed annually on all users of customary land given away as concessions by governments 
in the past. The revenue would be passed on to the adat community holding customary rights over 
the land involved. Crucially, the provincial and kabupaten governments would be required to un-
dertake a participatory land-mapping project to determine the borders of customary land (Article 
116). To speed up the process, NGOs and academics with expertise in mapping could be invited 
to help.
In the all-important mining sector, both drafts list principles that all mining companies 
should abide by, such as transparency and accountability. The Manokwari draft adds three that 
are missing from the Jayapura draft: ensuring the prosperity of indigenous Papuans, respecting 
their rights and opening employment opportunities for them. It then requires the companies to 
prepare and train indigenous Papuan to fill available positions, including managerial ones. 
The Jayapura draft focuses on giving the provincial government the authority to issue licenses 
and to own shares in all resource extraction companies operating in Papua (this last is aimed 
particularly at Freeport, the giant copper and gold mine in central Papua). The Manokwari draft 
focuses on getting returns to individual Papuans, saying those who own or control land on 
which exploration and exploitation take place are entitled to appropriate compensation, includ-
ing cash payments for use of any natural resources owned by the indigenous population con-
cerned (Article 96). Why cash rather than other kinds of payments is not clear, but the principle 
goes far beyond the Jayapura draft’s premise that if revenue gets to the provincial government, it 
will automatically get to the people. Representatives of the owners of the tanah ulayat (customary 
land, communally owned) should have the right to shares in the company concerned and to sit 
on the board, and the company has an obligation to set aside alternative land for agricultural 
purposes and provide liveable housing. Customary leaders are obliged to manage the compen-
sation received so that the benefits will be available to future generations (Article 96.5).
C. Education and Health
As noted, one of the most detailed sections of the Manokwari draft is on education (Section 24). 
It starts from the principle that indigenous Papuans have a right to quality education that is free 
through junior high school and fully up to date in terms of knowledge and technology, with a 
curriculum set by the provincial governments. It then goes on to map out a plan for how to im-
prove education in Papua, generally acknowledged to be abysmal and marked by a high rate of 
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teacher absenteeism.16  The provincial and kabupaten governments would be required to provide 
the widest possible opportunities to any institutions willing to help improve education: NGOs, 
private institutes and the business community. They would be required to provide subsidies to 
private educational institutes willing to work as partners with the government in this effort. In-
digenous children would be required to attend school up to the age of fifteen, at no cost. Within 
five years of the law’s coming into force, all children over the age of seven would be required to 
be literate, and within fifteen years, all indigenous Papuans over the age of eighteen would be 
required to have at least a junior high school education. Special attention and funding would 
be given to non-formal and adult education, and to education in remote areas. The government 
would provide special education both for gifted students and those with learning disabilities. It 
would provide for multiethnic dormitories as needed at the high school level. Businesses would 
be required to provide schooling for the children of all employees and ensure that school-age 
children from the Papuan community were gradually introduced to business operations. 
As for teachers, the government would conduct regular evaluations and provide incentives 
and sanctions as necessary to improve teaching quality. It would give incentives to non-civil 
servants, college graduates and retirees to become teachers so as to help address the teacher 
shortage. 
Similarly detailed plans are laid out for improving healthcare in remote areas, with special 
attention to the need for measures to prevent the further spread of  HIV/AIDS, as well as to treat 
and support those afflicted and remove the negative stigma against them (Article 138).
D. Human Rights
On human rights, the Manokwari draft contains what is effectively a bill of civil and political 
rights, with additional rights spelled out for women and children.  Both drafts call for a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, using the wording of the 2001 law that the aim would be 
“clarifying Papuan history in order to strengthen national unity within the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia [NKRI]”—not a promising starting point for reconciliation, but this was 
the compromise worked out in 2001, when the Papuan drafters had proposed the creation of a 
“Commission for the Rectification of History.”17  
Both drafts contain provisions for an independent Human Rights Commission for Papua – 
not necessarily linked to the National Commission on Human Rights as the 2001 law mandates. 
In addition, the Manokwari draft calls for human rights courts to be set up in the capitals of both 
Papua and Papua Barat, with prison sentences for those convicted of human rights violations 
and appropriate compensation to victims. The courts would be part of the Indonesian system of 
human rights courts established by law in 2000.
E. Foreign Affairs
Both drafts contain a section on “limited foreign affairs authority”. The original section in the 
Jayapura draft was built on one of Enembe’s twenty points and was largely focused relations 
with the Pacific region, allowing Papua to represent Jakarta in some bilateral forums, arrange 
cross-border economic cooperation and stimulate development of border areas.  The Manok-
wari draft removes any reference to the Pacific per se but gives the governors authority to devel-
op limited bilateral relations with their “immediate neighbours”. 
16 A recent assessment by UNICEF showed that 47 per cent of primary school teachers were not showing up to work. “47 
Persen Guru SD di Papua Mangkir”, Cenderawasih Pos, 13 November 2013.
17 “Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua Dalam Bentuk Wilayah 
Berpemerintahan Sendiri”, Article 43 in 2001 draft made available electronically to IPAC.
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The appearance of both drafts comes just a month before the foreign ministers of the Mel-
anesian Spearhead Group (MSG), an alliance of Pacific countries that have been traditionally 
sympathetic to Papua’s independence movement, are planning to visit Papua at the invitation of 
the Indonesian government. The invitation was a way of heading off a bid for membership at the 
group’s June 2013 meeting of one Papuan independence group.18 The MSG decided to defer con-
sideration of the bid until after the ministers’ visit. Some in Papua suggest that the government 
may be looking for an excuse to postpone the visit, and may suggest that because of the heated 
atmosphere or ongoing discussions with regard to special autonomy, late December would not 
be a good time to come.  In any case, the interest of the Pacific region in Papua will make officials 
in Jakarta nervous about expanding provincial powers in this area.The Manokwari draft also 
includes a provision that would allow the Governor to provide recommendations to the immi-
gration service on allowing foreigners to enter Papua and require written justification in cases 
where such permission was not granted.
F. Sports
The Jayapura draft places a heavy emphasis on sports. Papua would be able to field teams directly 
for and host international sporting events. Government at the national, provincial and district 
levels would be required build the capacity of Papuan youth in sports, with the provincial gov-
ernment providing funds for sports facilities and professional teams out of special autonomy 
funds. The Manokwari draft obliges government at all levels to actively search for and develop 
the talents of indigenous Papuans who show promise in sports. Under the Jayapura draft, all 
companies operating in Papua would be required to contribute 0.5 per cent of their net income 
to sports in Papua; the Manokwari draft does not specify a figure but says that the government 
should give incentives to the business community to participate in the development of sports. 
These provisions reflect the passion of Papuans for sports, especially football, but also the fact 
that it is an area in which Papuans can more than hold their own with athletes from other parts 
of Indonesia and as such, a source of pride.19
G. Structure
Both drafts keep the current governmental structure largely unchanged, though they increase 
the number of appointed seats within the provincial legislatures to be reserved for indigenous 
Papuans from an additional one-fourth of the total to an additional one-third. In the twelve 
years since the original otsus was adopted, however, the Papuan provincial administration has 
never worked out a legal mechanism for appointments, and these “otsus seats” remain empty.20
Both drafts keep the provision in the 2001 law that the governor and deputy governor must 
be indigenous Papuans; the Manokwari draft extends this to bupati (heads of kabupaten) and 
mayors, as well as their deputies. The MRP, as noted, wants this extended down to village heads.
18 In June 2013, the MSG, consisting of the governments of Vanuatu, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands as well 
as the New Caledonian political movement called Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), considered a 
bid from the pro-independence exile group West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) to become a member. 
WPNCL’s leadership, including former OPM member Rex Rumakiek,who left Papua in 1970, is based in Vanuatu, the MSG 
member most outspoken in support of its accession to the group. Indonesia has observer status. See “Communiqué of the 
19th MSG Leaders’ Summit”, 20 June 2013, available at www.msgsec.info/images/PDF/leaders%20communique%20-%20
retreat%20final.pdf.
19 Sports are important politically in Papua in part because of the relative prowess of Papuan football players (Persipura, 
the Jayapura team, has led the Indonesia Super League in recent years). Across Indonesia, sports funding is also a famous 
source of corruption.
20 A draft perdasus on how the otsus seats would be appointed is reportedly ready for discussion by the DPRP. “Raperdasus 
11 Kursi DPRP Tahap Finalisasi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 7 November 2013.
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In the past the definition of indigenous Papuan has been contested, but both drafts track the 
wording of the 2001 law that defines an indigenous Papuan as “anyone of Melanesian race who 
belongs to one of the indigenous ethnic groups of Papua or anyone not of Papuan origin who 
has been accepted as an indigenous Papuan in accordance with the traditions and customs of 
the indigenous group concerned”.
H. Revenue
The Jayapura draft’s most striking proposed changes concern the amount of money Papua would 
receive from the central government. Along with Aceh, Papua and Papua Barat already benefit 
from special allocations that other provinces do not receive. The largest of these is the special 
autonomy funds allocation (dana otsus), which in 2013 totalled Rp. 6.22 trillion for the two 
provinces (roughly U.S. $541 million); in Papua province this figure represented just over half of 
the province’s annual revenue.21 The Jayapura draft would see this amount increase by 150 per 
cent (bringing in a further U.S. $811 million into the combined provincial coffers). 
Another area where both provinces receive increased allocations is in revenue-sharing (dana 
bagi hasil) of natural resource extraction. Provisions in the 2001 law grant an increased share of 
oil and gas revenues (70 per cent compared to just 16 per cent for other regions)—in reality these 
only benefit Papua Barat as Papua has no oil or gas income. The Jayapura draft would increase the 
share of all natural resource revenues to 90 per cent.22 It would also raise the provincial govern-
ment’s share of income tax revenues from 20 to 50 per cent, and land and building tax revenues 
from 80 or 90 per cent to 100 per cent. All these provisions were kept in the Manokwari draft.
The estimated net effect of these changes when taken together, based on 2012 revenues, could 
mean close to an extra U.S. $1 billion flowing into the accounts of local government—an impres-
sive proposition, even as an opening bargaining position.
Both drafts call for local government at all levels to manage the otsus funds separately from 
other revenue sources, an important step towards better management. The 2001 law and the 
Jayapura draft state that these funds should be used primarily for funding health and education 
projects, but the Manokwari draft goes much further, setting clear spending targets: 20 per cent 
on education and skills training, 20 per cent for health and maternal and child nutrition, 20 per 
cent for poverty reduction and people’s economy, 10 per cent for social assistance, 25 per cent 
for village-level infrastructure and housing projects, 4.5 per cent for the MRP/MRPB and other 
otsus institutions, and only the remaining 0.5 per cent for discretionary spending.
I. Pemekaran
There is very little said in either draft about pemekaran – the creation of new provinces and 
kabupaten – a process that is resulting in Papua being carved up into smaller and smaller units, 
21 The total allocation of otsus funds for Papua and Papua Barat is calculated as 2 per cent of the annual general funds alloca-
tion (dana alokasi umum); the two provinces split this 70:30 based on the terms of the 2008 law that extended the special 
autonomy regime to cover Papua Barat. Both provinces also benefit from a sizeable separate allocation of otsus infrastruc-
ture funds (dana tambahan infrastruktur dalam rangka otsus) that is determined each year in the budget without a specific 
formula, based on a proposal from the provincial governments. In the 2013 Papua province budget, the otsus funds and 
the otsus infrastructure funds together constituted 60 per cent of provincial government revenues. See Badan Pengelo-
la Keuangan dan Aset Daerah, Provinsi Papua, “Pengalokasian Dana OTSUS Papua Tahun Anggaran 2013”, available at 
bpkad.papua.go.id/page/45/pengalokasian-dana-otsus-papua-tahun-anggaran-2013.htm.
22 Under Law 33/2004, 80 per cent of revenues derived from forestry, plantation, fishery and mining resources go to the orig-
inating province, 30.5 per cent of natural gas revenues and 15.5 per cent of oil revenues. Under the terms of Law 21/2001, 
Papua and Papua Barat receive 70 per cent of gas and oil revenues and will continue to do so for 25 years. The language in 
both the otsus plus drafts would reset this clock.
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mostly along ethnic or clan lines.23 The power given the MRP in the original autonomy law to 
approve any provincial divisions was undercut in 2003 by the presidential fiat that split Papua 
in two. At the kabupaten level, powers of the governor to approve the creation of new kabupaten 
is being undercut by parliamentary initiatives in Jakarta, whereby local campaigners for a new 
kabupaten can make their case directly to Commission II of the parliament, even though this is 
not how the process is supposed to work. 
Neither the central government, which periodically announces a moratorium on further 
splits but never enshrines its exhortations in law, nor the governors, who are not interested in 
seeing their territories further eroded, seem able to stem the tide. In October 2013, the national 
parliament formally proposed draft legislation that would create 30 new kabupaten and three 
new provinces across Papua.24 Few of these new units are likely to be approved before national 
elections in 2014; writing them into draft legislation may have been an easy bid for political 
support in advance of the polls. But many in Papua expect that most of them will eventually 
come into being, even if it takes several years, with the province of South Papua, with Merauke 
as its capital, likely to be the first off the block. Nothing in the current draft suggests alternative 
procedures or stricter conditions for dividing Papua.25 
J. Local elections and political parties
Despite Governor Enembe’s support for abandoning direct elections at the district and provin-
cial levels and returning to election by local legislatures, the Jayapura draft makes no changes 
to local election procedures. The Manokwari draft merely says that these elections will be the 
subject of future special regulations (peraturan daerah khusus, perdasus), which leaves the door 
open for establishing different procedures to those under effect in national legislation. 
Both drafts have provisions on the establishment of local parties. In Aceh, the establishment 
of parties that represented only a provincial, not a national constituency, became the deal-maker 
in the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement that ended conflict between the Indonesian government 
and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). GAM formed a local party, 
Partai Aceh, which proved to be a formidable political machine and GAM’s route to control of 
the legislative and executive branches of the provincial government, as well as many districts – a 
development which is not likely to make officials in Jakarta enthusiastic supporters of Papuan 
parties.26
The original special autonomy law had a provision on local parties but effectively nullified 
any possibility of their establishment by a clause requiring them to be consistent with existing 
legislation – and existing law on political parties required representation in more than half of 
23 See IPAC Report No. 3, “Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble”, 9 October 2013.
24 The three new provinces are Papua Barat Daya, Papua Tengah and Papua Selatan. The twenty-one new kabupaten in Papua 
province (and the kabupaten out of which they are being carved) are: Gili Menawa (from Jayapura); Moyo (from Boven 
Digoel); Kota Merauke (from Kab. Merauke); Baliem Center (from both Tolikara and Lanny Jaya); Boboga (from Tolika-
ra); Puncak Trikora (from Lanny Jaya); Muara Digoel and Admi Korbay (both from Mappi); Katengban (Pegunungan 
Bintang); Lembah Baliem and Okika (from Jayawijaya); Yapen Barat Utara and Yapen Timur (Kepualaun Yapen); Pulau 
Numfor (from Biak); Yalimek, Yahukimo Barat, Mambera Hulu, Yahukimo Barat Daya, Yahukimo Timur and Yahukimo 
Utara (all from Yahukimo); and Gondumisisare (from Waropen). The nine new kabupaten from Papua Barat are: Malamoy 
and Maybrat Sau (from Sorong); Raja Ampat Utara and Raja Ampat Selatan (from Raja Ampat); Maskona (from Teluk Bin-
tuni); Okas (from Fak-Fak); Manokwari Barat and Kota Manokwari (from Manokwari); and Imeo (from Sorong Selatan).
25 Such provisions would probably be seen as a challenge to national law which spells out the procedures for creating new 
kabupaten and provinces across the country. If otsus plus is seen as a wish list, however, the governor could try to articulate 
the criteria or enforcement procedures that he would like to see used.
26 In a visit to Jayapura in July 2012, Minister of Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi told the press that Aceh had local political 
parties because as a result of the 2005 peace agreement, there were no longer armed groups operating there. Papua still had 
armed movements operating, he said, and they could use local parties as a vehicle for gaining access to office. “Papua Beda 
Dengan Aceh”, JPNN, 14 July 2012.
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Indonesia’s provinces. The new drafts remove that clause. The new versions also suggest that 
only indigenous Papuans can form local parties, though any residents of Papua can be members. 
The Manokwari draft goes further to include substantial detail on what party creation would 
entail, and what rights and responsibilities local parties would have. 
The concern in Jakarta may be not only that allowing local parties could lead to pro-indepen-
dence groups trying to register but also that it could lead to more conflict – and Papua already 
has a high rate of violence in local elections.27
IV. OPPOSITION AND RESPONSE
Opposition to otsus plus is coming from two main groups, but more to the idea than the sub-
stance, since few members of the public have seen either draft. One is from people who object to 
what they see as the closed process of drafting and the lack of a more open debate. The second is 
from activists who object in principle to the idea of amending a failed law, especially when it is 
seen as a concept concocted in Jakarta. 
A. Process
Many community leaders and activists in both provinces were concerned about the closed na-
ture of the drafting process. They compared it unfavourably to the process of drafting the origi-
nal 2001 law, in which there had been a serious effort to gather input from across Papua. Then, 
a drafting committee composed of Papuan intellectuals had been set up in December 2000 
under the rector of Cenderawasih University, the state university in Jayapura. For two weeks, it 
collected input from a variety of sources, including NGOs and non-violent pro-independence 
groups as well as local officials. The then governor, Jaap Solossa, spoke on radio and television, 
describing the process and inviting the public to contribute to the discussion, including by 
sending representatives to Jayapura to a public Study Forum where an initial draft would be 
discussed. In late January 2001, the drafting committee divided into four teams and travelled 
around Papua to collect ideas and hear views of community leaders. In early March, the legal 
drafting began to try and take all these views into account.28 
Eleven different drafts were produced by the time the two-day “Study Forum on Special 
Autonomy for a New Papua” was convened on 28 March, just a few weeks later. Despite pro-
tests from some that there should be no compromise on independence, forum representatives 
reviewed the latest draft and made suggestions for further changes. A final version was pre-
sented to the governor in mid-April. It was quickly approved by the provincial legislature and 
then presented to then President Abdurrahman Wahid and his then Coordinating Minister for 
Politics and Security, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono – now president. From there it went to the 
national parliament where a special committee was formed in June to review the draft, with 
the Papuan drafting team attending all sessions, and a watered down version passed in October 
2001. It was signed into law on 21 November 2001.29
The speed and efficiency of the process were remarkable. It helped that Papuans then were 
negotiating from a position of strength, with a strong non-violent pro-independence movement 
that convinced officials that a workable alternative to independence had to be found. The law 
27 See discussion of election violence in Nduga and Puncak in “Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble”, op.cit.
28 For a detailed description of the process, see Agus Sumule, “Protection and Empowerment of the Rights of Indigenous 
People of Papua (Irian Jaya) Over Natural Resources Under Special Autonomy: From legal opportunities to the chal-
lenge of implementation”, Resource Management in Asia-Pacific, Working Paper No.36, 2002, pp.11-13, available at 
digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40984/3/rmap_wp36.pdf
29 Ibid.
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finally produced was one that many Papuans felt they owned, even in its diluted form. The 
cooperative spirit thus produced was destroyed when less than two years later, in 2003, the 
government of Megawati Soekarnoputri divided Papua into two provinces in complete contra-
vention of the law and undid any belief in Jakarta’s good faith.
This time, however, there is no sense of ownership – or not yet, at any rate. One prominent 
Papuan community leader said in early November that he could not voice an opinion about the 
Jayapura draft because he had not seen it – and neither had any of his friends.
In Papua Barat, the drafters are convinced that it would only take three weeks to hold consul-
tations in every part of the province. It would be longer in Papua, given the areas that have to be 
reached, and then there would be additional time needed to reconcile the drafts. It is not clear 
how these consultations would be organized or how they might mesh with civil society struggles 
to bring about a dialogue with Jakarta on Papua. But without public buy-in, the drafts will be 
largely meaningless.
B. A Priori Rejection of a New Law
As the Jayapura draft appeared to be nearing finalization, a number of groups mobilized to pro-
test it. Students were among the most active protestors. On 4 November, hundreds gathered for a 
“long march” from Abepura, the suburb where Jayapura’s main university campuses are located, 
to the governor’s office. Organized by a coalition called the Movement of Students, Youth and 
People of Papua (Gerakan Mahasiswa Pemuda dan Rakyat Papua or GEMPAR), they rejected 
any expansion of otsus on the grounds that the 2001 special autonomy law had so patently failed 
that to suggest amending it was to insult the dignity of the Papuan people.30 GEMPAR tried to 
organize similar protests over the next few days, but police were out in force to arrest anyone 
for obstructing the rights of others under a 1998 law on protests, and the demonstrations were 
small. Seven GEMPAR activists were arrested in front of the MRP on 7 November; sixteen more 
were taken into custody the next day, but most were released without charge.31 
Some objected to the principle that any law on autonomy, given Papua’s history, could be a 
solution to its ills. “We don’t need a law, we need a referendum,” one customary leader said pri-
vately. He noted that at the same time that officials in Jakarta were professing to be concerned 
about Papuan welfare, they had set up a network of customary institutions called Lembaga Mas-
yarakat Adat (LMA), based in the coordinating ministry for political, security and legal affairs, 
that was designed to rival and undermine the more grassroots-based Dewan Adat Papua, that 
officials see as pro-independence.32
The perceived Jakarta origins of the otsus plus concept have also been a source of concern 
to some in Papua. Theo van den Broek, an adviser to many NGOs and a long-time resident of 
Papua, wrote a column bemoaning the tendency of some in the Papuan elite to be grateful for 
largesse from Jakarta rather than taking their fate into their own hands and working for change. 
There is something wrong, he writes, about the governor trying to get people excited just because 
the president promises to visit and give Papuans another “gift”. The gifts, he writes, too often 
are used as a way of trying to close off debate rather than seriously investigating problems and 
solutions.33 
A public debate on some of the strategies outlined in the Papua Barat draft could be a way of 
30 “Tolak RUU Otsus Plus, BEM PTS PTN di Jayapura Akan Duduki Kantor Gubernur”, Majalah Selangkah, 1 November 
2013.
31 “4 Mahasiswa Jadi Tersangka, 12 Dilepas”, Bintang Papua, 11 November 2013.
32 IPAC interview, Jayapura, 8 November 2013.
33 “Papua, korban dari pola ‘Bapak Bawa Hadiah’”, 25 June 2013, available at www.aldp-papua.com/papua-korban-dari-pola-
bapak-bawa-hadiah-bbh.
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collectively coming up with solutions to some of Papua’s thorniest problems. But it would require 
many in the activist community to make a leap of faith that working within an autonomy frame-
work was still possible.
Lukas Enembe seemed comfortable with all the criticism heaped on the Jayapura and was 
satisfied, before the Papua Barat draft emerged, that the Jayapura draft represented Papuan 
views. As of this writing, he had given no public reaction to the Papua Barat draft. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
Against all odds, a controversial effort to produce a legislative quick win before the end of the 
Yudhoyono presidency has produced a useful document. The Papua Barat government’s response 
to the Papuan government’s proposal for enhanced special autonomy contains some of the 
most innovative ideas in years on how to strengthen the economic and political position of 
indigenous Papuans. Some may go a little too far, some may fall a little short, but overall they 
are practical and constructive. The challenge now is to see if anyone will buy them. 
The obstacles are formidable. They include:
• A fractured local civil society that is largely distrustful of local government officials, many 
of whom are seen as more motivated by personal gain than by a commitment to Papuan 
welfare. The distrust of otsus plus as a concept has been reinforced by the absence of any 
effort on the part of the provincial administrations to solicit public opinion on the drafts. 
• Deep cynicism across Papua about the interest of the central government in any reform 
that would strengthen the position of indigenous Papuans. Some members of the Papuan 
elite feel they have been repeatedly betrayed by Jakarta, so why should they put time and 
effort into fine-tuning a policy proposal that will likely be blocked by Jakarta anyway? 
• Deep frustration among many officials in Jakarta that they can be seen to do no right 
and that any policy initiative runs afoul either of turf battles in Jakarta, lack of consensus 
among Papuans, or both. Also, wariness in Jakarta of taking any measures that might 
inadvertently strengthen pro-independence sentiment.
• Poor working relations between the two provincial administrations in Jayapura and 
Manokwari. In particular, the Papua Barat government under Bram Atururi is seen in 
Jayapura as having worked to undermine, rather than support, the original spirit of special 
autonomy, with steps such as June 2011 creation of a separate MRP for Papua Barat.
• A national parliament where political dynamics are such that it will always be difficult to 
muster broad support for what would be viewed as concessions to provinces that already 
receive so much in economic terms.
The only possibility of overcoming such hurdles is public discussion. This means that both 
administrations should drop the idea of trying to fast-track the bill, an effort which is likely to 
fail anyway. Instead, they should meet with religious, community and adat leaders after their 
two drafts are consolidated and work out a joint strategy and timeframe for consultation on the 
draft among Papuans, with an eye to getting the whole package revised and on the legislative 
agenda for 2015.  
The process could use the model of seeking inputs from the public on the original 2001 law. 
It could also could draw in part on experience of the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai 
Papua, JDP). The JDP held public consultations in communities across the two provinces in 
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2011 to draw up indicators for what a peaceful Papua would look like. Discussion on the con-
solidated otsus plus draft would need broader geographic and political reach. If civil society has 
been largely left outside the drafting of otsus plus, so too have those officials been largely left 
out of JDP’s work. This could be an opportunity for civil society and provincial officials to work 
together in pursuit of common goals.
If the road to finding consensus on a draft becomes totally blocked, then the drafters could try 
and salvage separate provisions of the draft, working with their respective provincial legislatures 
to restructure incentives for teaching in remote areas, for example, or encourage village-level 
mapping of customary land. Such piecemeal efforts would not have any of the clout, however, of 
a consensus position across both provinces to try to secure the position of indigenous Papuans 
in a time of rapid change. 
The prospect of national elections in 2014 offers a rare opportunity for a positive change of 
direction. New governments want to make a mark. If public debate can give Papuans a sense of 
ownership in a revised draft of otsus plus, then perhaps the next president can play a key role in 
championing it. There are too many useful provisions in the Manokwari draft to reject it out of 
hand before there has been serious discussion on the contents. 
